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BLOCK V NORTH DAKOTA EX REL. BOARD OF
UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL LANDS: A
RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION
OF THE QUIET TITLE ACT
Since its inception, the American judicial system' has provided the
means for aggrieved individuals to bring their detractors before a bar of
justice.2 Although the defendant in an action3 could be any private per-
son, corporation, or other entity, the United States could not be designated
a defendant without its consent.4 In the shadow of the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity,5 the United States has been reluctantly relinquishing its
1. The American colonists founded the United States government upon a "foundation
of English liberty" that included a right of trial by jury. See J. WOODBURN, THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 4-6 (1904); FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1927) (Resolution of the Continental
Congress (Oct. 14, 1774)) ("That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the
time of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and
immunities of free and natural born subjects within the realm of England.").
2. In his defense of the adoption of the United States Constitution, the influential
pseudonymous writer "Publius" expounded the propriety of a civil justice system in the new
American society.
Notwithstanding therefore the doubts I have expressed as to the essentiality of trial
by jury, in civil cases, to liberty, I admit that it is in most cases, under proper
regulation, an excellent method of determining questions of property; and that on
this account alone it would be entitled to a constitutional provision in its favor, if it
were possible to fix the limits within which it ought to be comprehended.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 23, 24 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
3. See generally F. JAMES JR. & G. HAZARD JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.1 (2d ed.
1977).
4. In many of the early cases, the Supreme Court upheld the bar of suits against the
United States. See, e.g., Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967); National City Bank of N.Y. v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675 (1927).
5. See generally Comment, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity." An Histori-
calAnaysis, 13 VILL. L. REV. 583 (1968). The Supreme Court clearly articulated its position
on sovereign immunity in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). The Lynch Court
stated that
[t]he sovereign's immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceed-
ing or the source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies alike to causes of
action arising under acts of Congress. . . and to those arising from some violation
of rights conferred upon the citizen by the Constitution. . . . The character of the
cause of action-the fact that it is in contract as distinguished from tort-may be
important in determining (as under the Tucker Act [24 Stat. 505]) whether consent
to sue was given. Otherwise it is of no significance. For immunity from suit is an
attribute of sovereignty which may not be bartered away.
Id at 582.
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immunity from suits.6 By 1948 the United States had enacted legislation
fully waiving its immunity in contract 7 and tort8 actions involving both
itself and its officers.9 Although the waiver in these areas allowed for some
relief against the sovereign,' 0 the United States retained its immunity from
suits involving disputes over title to land" until the passage of the Quiet
Title Act of 1972 (QTA).' 2
The QTA provides that the United States can be named as a defendant
in a civil action to quiet title to land in which it claims an interest.' 3 Along
with the recognition of the necessity of including the United States in land
title suits, Congress also delineated certain safeguards for the protection of
the public interest.14 One of these safeguards is subsection (f) of the QTA.
It provides a twelve-year statute of limitations that is designed primarily to
protect the goverment against state claims.' 5
Recently, a dispute has arisen regarding the intent of Congress in the
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982). The statute, entitled United States as Defendant, gives
the district court original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Claims Court, over actions
against the United States. Some relevant provisions include § 2410, allowing suits to be
maintained when the government's claim is in the nature of a security interest only; § 1347,
providing for suits to partition property in which the United States is a joint tenant or tenant
in common; § 1346(a)(2), the Tucker Act, granting the consent of the United States to be
sued where the plaintiff alleges that his property has been taken in violation of the
Constitution.
7. The Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887).
8. The Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 933 (1948).
9. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers.- Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1963); see generally Comment, Immunity of Federal Executive Officials to Damage
Suits for Constitutional Violation, 19 Hous. L. REV. 299 (1982).
10. See infra notes 42, 44.
11. Under the Tucker Act, the only remedy for the successful claimant is just compen-
sation. The claimant cannot obtain an injunction prohibiting trespass by the government.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982).
12. Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176 (1972) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(f), 1402(d),
2409a (1982)).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (1982), which allows quiet title actions against the govern-
ment to "adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an
interest, other than a security interest or water rights" (emphasis added). The section also
exempts "trust or restricted Indian lands." Id
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), (b), (f) (1982). The safeguards include: (1) exclusion of
Indian and trust lands from the scope of the Act; (2) payment of just compensation in cases
where the surrender of property would disrupt ongoing federal programs involving the land;
and (3) to avoid stale claims, a twelve-year statute of limitation on actions.
15. QTA subsection (f) provides that
[a]ny civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within
twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to
have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should
have known of the claim by the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (1982).
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application of the Act's twelve-year statute of limitations to land held in
trust for the public.' 6 Specifically, the lower federal courts have held that
the limitation on actions does not apply to states holding land in trust for
the public. 7 In contrast to this interpretation, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that the time bar provided by subsection (f) is applicable
to state claimants as well as to private claimants.
In Block v. North Dakota ex rel Board of University and School Lands,'8
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the sub-
section (f) limitation on QTA actions applies to states as well as to others
who sue under the Act.' 9 The Court held that states are not exempt from
the time limitation on QTA actions.2" It reasoned that the legislative his-
tory of the QTA does not provide evidence of congressional intent to ex-
empt states from the time-bar of subsection (f). Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that the statutory language of the Act does not provide an excep-
tion for civil actions by a state.
The State of North Dakota claimed title to the bed of a navigable stream
under the constitutional equal footing doctrine.2' The doctrine endows
new states with the same rights to submerged and submersible lands as the
original thirteen states.22 Despite the state's contention, the United States
claimed an interest in the same river bed.23 The federal government based
its claim on a theory of adverse possession resulting from its continuous
leasing of oil and gas rights along the stream and its connecting river.
24
North Dakota sought relief in federal district court against the Secretary of
16. The term "public trust lands" in this note refers to lands over which a state main-
tains its dominion and sovereignty. They are lands held in trust for the citizens of a state as
opposed to lands held by a state in a proprietary capacity. See generally 73A C.J.S. Public
Lands §§ 1-6 (1983).
17. See State of N. D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271,
275 (8th Cir. 1982); State of Cal. ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 512 F. Supp.
36, 40 (N.D. Cal. 1981); see generally Pueblo of Taos v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C.
1979).
18. 103 S. Ct. 1811 (1983).
19. Id. at 1814.
20. Id. at 1822.
21. State of N. D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and School Lands v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 619,
623 (D.N.D. 1981); see Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). In Pollard,
the Court applied article IV of the United States Constitution in upholding the "equal foot-
ing doctrine." The Court held that the original states should possess property rights to the
shores of navigable waters and the river beds under them. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 216, 230.
22. Under the "equal footing doctrine," states newly admitted into the Union have the
same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction as the original states within their respective bor-
ders. See, e.g., California ex rel. States Lands Comm'n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 281
n.9 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 422 (1982).
23. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. at 624.
24. Id
1984]
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the Interior, and others,25 to quiet title to the lands. The court rejected the
federal government's claim that under the QTA the subsection (f) statute
of limitations had run against North Dakota. Instead, the court reasoned
that the legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress did not intend
to defeat a claim by a state to land it holds in trust for the public.26 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed,27 reason-
ing that a statute of limitations can only apply to a sovereign when the
sovereign is expressly mentioned in the statute.28 The court further held
that a statute of limitations can also be applied to the state if such a pur-
pose can be derived from legislative intent.29 Because the court found the
public interest in quieting title to these lands to be paramount, it rejected
the government's claim that the QTA refers to "any" civil action and
therefore must include state actions.30
In an eight-to-one decision the United States Supreme Court reversed.3'
The Court held that because the statutory language of the QTA makes no
exception for civil actions by states, subsection (f) should be applied to any
civil action including actions by states.32 Writing for the majority, Justice
White maintained that the legislative history did not reflect congressional
intent to exempt the states from the subsection (f) limitation. Moreover, he
stated that the legislative history displayed a congressional intent designed
to foreclose totally any suit that occurred beyond the limitations period of
the QTA.33
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor maintained that statutes of limitation
are not applicable to a sovereign. 34 She emphasized that an inquiry into
congressional intent should not be restricted to the legislative history of
subsection (f),35 but should take into consideration the policy that public
rights must not be lost because of constraints on a sovereign. 36 She as-
25. Id at 619. The defendants were: Cecil Andrus, Secretary of the Interior; Bob Berg-
land, Secretary of Agriculture; Frank Gregg, Director of the United States Bureau of Land
Management; and John R. McGuire, Chief of the United States Forest Service.
26. Id at 625.
27. State of N. D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 103 S. Ct.
1811 (1983).
28. Andrus, 671 F.2d at 274.
29. Id. at 274-75.
30. Id. at 275.
31. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1811.
32. Id at 1820.
33. Id. at 1820.
34. Id at 1823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35. Id
36. Id at 1824.
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serted that the special nature of the river bed land37 made it "difficult to
believe that Congress intended to deny States dominion over these lands
by silently extinguishing their right to quiet title."
3 8
This Note will focus upon the Block decision and the contrasting inter-
pretations of congressional intent in enacting the QTA. It will discuss the
evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its application to limi-
tations of actions and public trust lands. Employing Supreme Court deci-
sions, this Note will attempt to illustrate the incompatibility of the Block
decision with previous decisions of the Court in this area. Finally, this
Note will conclude with a comment on the probable impact of Block on
future cases involving limitations on actions by states holding land in trust
for the public.
I. THE RELINQUISHMENT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BY THE UNITED
STATES
In the absence of an express waiver by Congress, individual states and
other entities are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suing
the United States.39 Legislative yielding of the doctrine first appeared in
the contract area with enactment of the Tucker Act.' The Tucker Act
allows a private claimant to seek a monetary remedy in a contract suit
against the federal government." In the context of land disputes, the Act
enables private claimants to assert a claim for monetary damages by show-
ing that the property has been taken without formal eminent domain pro-
ceedings.42 Because the Tucker Act does not allow for recovery of the
37. Id. at 1826. Justice O'Connor attributed the "special importance" of the lands to
congressional recognition of the trust duty of the sovereign. Citing the Submerged Lands
Act, she maintained that
[i]t is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and
ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the re-
spective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the
right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and
natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are, sub-
ject to the provision hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in, and
assigned to the respective States. ...
Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1826 & n.6 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
38. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1826.
39. See supra notes 5-6.
40. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 11.
42. The Tucker Act gives federal district courts and the court of claims jurisdiction over
claims "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or... upon any...
contract .. .[for] damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491
(1982).
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property itself, the impact of its provisions are limited in land title
disputes.
Another major inroad in the relinquishment of sovereign immunity oc-
curred sixty-one years later with the passage of the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA).43 The FTCA was primarily designed to provide for damages
when the United States was the wrongdoer in a tort action." Like the
Tucker Act, the FTCA limited a claimant to monetary damages.45 Addi-
tionally, under its provisions, the claimant was similarly unable to obtain
title to disputed land.46
It was not until the passage of the Quiet Title Act (QTA)47 that Congress
made a concerted effort to waive totally the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in land title disputes involving the United States. Essentially, the
QTA allows the quieting of title in disputes in which the government
claims an interest in land. Unlike previous legislation involving land dis-
putes with the sovereign, the QTA provides a remedy of possession to the
prevailing party.48 The passage of the QTA signaled congressional recog-
nition that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not bar the judicial
resolution of land title disputes between the United States and private citi-
zens.4 9 It is undisputed that the statutory reform provided by the QTA
was essential in providing an equitable solution to land disputes involving
the federal government."0 An examination of the history of these disputes
43. See supra note 8.
44. The FTCA provides "money damages... for injury or loss of property, or per-
sonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment ..... 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
45. Id
46. See generally Steadman, "'Forgive U.S. Its Trespasses?": Land Title Disputes with the
Sovereign-Present Remedies and Prospective Reform, 1972 DUKE L. REV. 15, 36-39.
47. See supra note 12.
48. See supra notes 7, 11.
49. See Steadman, supra note 46, at 50-56. The author presents a pre-QTA analysis of
the need for judicial reform in this area.
50. Id at 50-51. ("One of the most firmly established principles in American jurispru-
dence is that where land is involved there is no substitute for the thing itself.") See Roady,
Lee, Land, Larson, and Malone - Sovereign immunity Revisited, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1062
(1965). The author poetically delineated the abuse of the doctrine of sovereign immunity:
The importance of the exception cannot be ignored:
It is vital to all to have legal sword
With which owners can prevent constitutional abuse
Or a taking of property for an illegal use.
To dismiss every case at the Government's word
In a constitutional democracy is patently absurd.
Id at 1070; see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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will illustrate that enactment of the QTA was long overdue.5'
II. HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND LAND TITLE DISPUTES
A. Early Supreme Court Interpretations of the Sovereign's Right to
Immunity Against Suit
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first applied in the area of
claims of title to property held by an officer of the government. In an early
case, United States v. Lee ,52 the Supreme Court held that, except in in-
stances of unconstitutional action, the United States can only be sued as a
party defendant if the government consents to suit or Congress has pro-
vided for consent by statute 3 In Lee, a plot of land formerly owned by
the descendants of General Robert E. Lee had come into the government's
possession as a result of a default in the payment of property taxes.54 The
descendants brought suit55 claiming wrongful possession because the taxes
had not been accepted when tendered.56 At the time of the suit, the prop-
erty57 was controlled by officers of the United States government. 58 The
government asserted that the taxes had been refused because of an earlier
ruling that overdue taxes would be received only when tendered in person
by property owners.59 Additionally, the government insisted that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity precluded a judicial determination of the
60merits.
The trial court ruled against the government, holding that the tax sale
certificate did not divest the Lees of their property.6' The judgment was
51. Although a thorough historical review of sovereign immunity and land title disputes
is beyond the scope of this Note, the cases reviewed are considered by commentators to be
fundamental to the development of the law in this area. See Steadman, supra note 46 and
Roady, supra note 1i.
52. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
53. Id. at 204-06.
54. Id at 197.
55. Id. at 196-97. To avoid a direct suit against the United States, the original suit was
brought against named defendants Kaufman and Strong, who were federal officers in pos-
session of the property under orders of the Secretary of War.
56. Id. at 197.
57. The United States designated the property as Arlington Cemetery. Id at 198.
58. Id at 249-51. The Court stated that the "defendants occupied the same only as such
officers and agents in obedience to orders of the War Department of the United States, and
making no claim of right to the title or possession except as such officers." Id at 251.
59. Id. at 200-01. In Lee, the United States tax commissioners had established and
followed a general rule whereby "they refused ... [to accept taxes] on property ... from
any one but the owner." Id
60. Id at 198.
61. Id at 198-99. The trial court noted that
[t]he plaintiff offered evidence establishing title in himself, by the will of his grand-
1984]
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upheld by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Virginia.62 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the government's plea
of sovereign immunity. The Court held that by refusing to accept the tax
payments the government had deprived the Lees of an important right.63
It reasoned that the deprivation of the right to pay taxes created a wrong-
ful unconstitutional possession of the property held by the government. 
6
The Court concluded, therefore, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
will not protect an agent of the government from an action for specific
relief when the agent is tortiously and wrongfully in possession of property
owned by a claimant.65
More than half a century after Lee, allegations of an unlawful taking by
the government were asserted again in Land v. Dollar.66 In Land, the
plaintiff, Dollar, claimed to have pledged common stock to the United
States Maritime Commission as collateral for a debt.67 The defendant
Commission argued that the shares had not been pledged but transferred
outright.68 The Commission subsequently offered the stock for sale to the
public.69 Dollar brought suit based on a claim that the Commission un-
lawfully possessed and illegally withheld the stock.7" The trial court sum-
marily dismissed the suit reasoning that it could not be brought against the
sovereign.7'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit72 reversed and remanded for a hearing on the merits. 73 Citing earlier
cases,74 the court held that because the Commission had entered into a
commercial field of activity, a restriction should be placed on its use of the
father, George Washington Parke Curtis, who devised the Arlington estate to his
daughter, the wife of Gen. Robert E. Lee, for life, and after her death to the plain-
tiff. This, with the long possession under that title, made a primafacie right of
recovery in plaintiff.
Id
62. Lee v. Kaufman, 15 F. Cas. 204 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (No. 8192)).
63. 106 U.S. at 202.
64. Id at 219-20.
65. The force of the judgment was to grant possession to Lee. The judgment, however,
was not res judicata against the United States. It only settled the controversy over posses-
sion as between the Lees and the government agents. Id at 222.
66. 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
67. Id at 734.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Id
72. Dollar v. Land, 154 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
73. Id at 313.
74. Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943); Federal Housing Admin. Region
No. 4 v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940); Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
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sovereign immunity plea.75 On appeal, the Supreme Court analogized the
Land controversy to the situation in Lee.76 Specifically, the Court rea-
soned that Dollar was entitled to bring his suit because, as in Lee, asser-
tions by government officials of their authority to act7 7 did not prevent an
inquiry into the lawfulness of their actions.78 On this theme, the Court
affirmed the appeals court's decision. It held that if the property is re-
tained unlawfully, then the government official is in effect a tortfeasor who
has illegally exceeded the bounds of his authority.79
The first departure from the holdings of Lee and Land8 ° surfaced in
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.81 In Larson, Domestic
contracted for a quantity of coal from the War Assets Administration. The
Administration later informed the company that the sale had been can-
celled and subsequently entered into negotiations with another party for
the sale of the coal.82 In an effort to stop the sale, Domestic filed for an
injunction in the district court.83 The court dismissed the action ruling
that it did not have jurisdiction over a suit against the United States.84
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit8"
reversed and remanded in order to determine whether there had been an
illegal interference with property rights. In accordance with Lee, the court
reasoned that the lower court should inquire into whether there had been a
valid contract of sale.86
In a unique departure from the Lee decision, the Supreme Court re-
versed. 87 The Court narrowed the Lee test for denying the government
sovereign immunity. It required that in order to defeat the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, not only must the government agent's holding of
property be tortious and wrongful, the agent's act must also be statutorily
75. Dollar, 159 F.2d at 312.
76. Land, 330 U.S. at 736
77. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. In Lee the question involved the
authority of the tax commissioner to refuse to accept tax payment from anyone but the
owner of the subject property. In Land the question involved the authority of the Maritime
Commission to take common stock to secure a contract debt. Id.
78. Land, 330 U.S. at 736.
79. Id. at 738.
80. For some time, Land was the last Supreme Court case to follow the Lee theme of
judicial fairness. See, e.g., Steadman, supra note 46, at 55-56.
81. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
82. Id at 684.
83. Id. at 685.
84. Id. at 684-85.
85. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. v. Littlejohn, 165 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
86. Id. at 238. In effect, Larson upheld the judicial delimitation of the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity found in Lee. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
87. 337 U.S. at 682.
1984]
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or constitutionally prohibited. The Court noted that although Domestic
had claimed that the Administration had acted illegally, Domestic had not
alleged that this conduct had been unconstitutional.88 It emphasized that
the mere allegation of a cause of action did not defeat the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity.89 Therefore, the Larson Court concluded that the with-
holding of the property was within the statutory powers of the War Assets
Administration, and because the agent's act was not unconstitutional or
restricted by statute, the Administration was protected by the immunity
doctrine.
Although Lee appears to be the basis of authority for the decision in
Larson,9 it is generally held by commentators that Larson distorted the
Lee and Land holdings.91 Basically, the case reactivated the doctrine of
sovereign immunity92. Along with its progeny, Malone v. Bowdoin ,93 Lar-
son made it difficult to bring suit against federal officials as a means of title
dispute resolution.94
Malone was a United States Forest Service officer in charge of and in
possession of land acquired by the Government in 1936.9' Bowdoin and
others brought an action of ejectment against Malone claiming title to the
land by a will executed in 1857.96 Relying on Larson, the district court
dismissed the case97 because the government had not consented to be sued
88. Id at 691-93.
89. Id.
90. The Court noted that Congress has provided different methods of remedies but
maintained that "[t]he differentiations as to remedy which the Congress has erected would
be rendered nugatory if the basis on which they rest-the assumed immunity of the sover-
eign from suit in the absence of consent-were undermined by an unwarranted extension of
the Lee doctrine." Id at 705.
91. See generally Roady, supra note 50, at 1066.
92. See Comment, The Conservationists and the Public Lands. Administrative and Judi-
cial Remedies Relating to the Use and Disposition of the Public Lands Administered by the
Department of the Interior, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1200, 1224 (1970).
93. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
94. Id. at 647. Like Larson, in Malone there were no allegations that a government
official had exceeded his statutory powers. Moreover, there was no claim of an unconstitu-
tional taking. Therefore, absent the two Larson exceptions the sovereign immunity doctrine
was again upheld by the Court. The Larson exceptions provided that suits against officials
are allowed only if: (1) the action is not within the official power of the officer or, (2) if the
exercise of power is unconstitutional. Larson, 337 U.S. at 702.
95. Malone, 369 U.S. at 643-44.
96. Bowdoin claimed that one Martha A. Sanders had devised only a life interest to the
United States and as successors to the interest of the remainderman, they (Bowdoin and
others) were entitled to possession. Malone, 369 U.S. at 644 n.2.
97. Doe v. Roe, 186 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd sub nom. Bowdoin v. Malone,
284 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960). The trial court rejected Bowdoin's claim of a right to maintain
the ejectment suit based on United States v. Lee and Land v. Dollar. Relying on Larson, the
Malone court maintained that "[t]he key to the possible distinction between Lee and Larson
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nor had it waived its immunity from suit.98 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 99 Citing Lee, the court stated that
the Supreme Court had never questioned the validity of ejectment actions
seeking to remove government agents from wrongfully possessing land. l°°
Thus, the court reasoned that Malone's tortious and illegal act of posses-
sion was not protected by the immunity asserted by the United States and
could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court.' 0 ' On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, 102 holding that because there had been no claim
of an unconstitutional taking or an allegation that a government official
had exceeded his statutory powers, Larson mandated dismissal.0 3
Prior to the 1972 enactment of the QTA, Malone was the "law of the
land in title dispute cases.' Malone, like Larson, limited relief in suits
against government officers to a very narrow class of cases.' 0 5 Moreover,
neither the legislation of the Tucker Act nor the FTCA provided the
claimant with title to disputed property."°6 Therefore, the overall effect of
Malone was to relegate the successful claimant to a remedy of just com-
pensation as opposed to one of specific relief. '0 7 In the ten years following
is contained in footnote 17 to Larson, pointing out that Lee was decided in 1882 before the
enactment of the Tucker Act." Id at 408. Footnote 17 states that "[tihe Lee case was de-
cided in 1882. At that time there clearly was no remedy available by which he could have
obtained compensation for the taking of his land. Whether compensation could be obtained
today in such a case is, of course, not the issue here." Larson, 337 U.S. at 697.
98. Doe, 186 F. Supp. at 408.
99. Bowdoin v. Malone, 284 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960).
100. Id. at 105.
101. Id
102. 369 U.S. at 648. The Court granted certiorari specifically to review the doctrine of
sovereign immunity within the category of suits against government agents that affect prop-
erty in which the United States claims an interest. The Court noted that a number of cases
had denied relief under similar circumstances on the ground of sovereign immunity. In
reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on the two Larson exceptions, see supra note
94, thereby establishing a general rule for the use of sovereign immunity in property disputes
with the government. The Malone Court stated that
the Court expressly postulated the rule that the action of a federal officer affecting
property claimed by a plaintiff can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief
against the officer as an individual only if the officer's action is "not within the
officer's statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their
exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void.
Malone, 369 U.S. at 647 (citing Larson, 337 U.S. at 702).
103. Malone, 369 U.S. at 648. See Jaffe, supra note 9, at 39. As stated by Jaffe, "in
Malone the Court distinctly saves the authority of Lee [in cases] 'where there is a claim' of
'an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.'" Id at 38 (footnote
omitted).
104. See Steadman, supra note 46, at 24.
105. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text.
107. 369 U.S. at 647. The Court noted that "[u]nlike the situation in the Lee case, there
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Malone, the need for legislative reform was recognized and eventually ac-
ted upon with passage of the Quiet Title Act of 1972.
B. The Evolution of the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and The Legislative
History of Subsection 09
The QTA was enacted to enable private parties to bring actions to quiet
title to property in which the United States claimed an interest. The origi-
nal version of the QTA, bill S. 216,108 was introduced in the 92nd Congress
by Senator Church of Idaho.i 9 His constituents had been affected by the
federal government's claim to land that had been fraudulently surveyed
along the Snake River in Idaho."' Senator Church proposed S. 216 pri-
marily as a means of relief for his displaced constituents. The bill's under-
lying purpose, however, was to eliminate the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from a system of government "where the courts are established,
not for the convenience of the sovereign, but to serve the people."l 1 '
The Senate" 2 and House 1 3 reports on S. 21614 both reveal that Con-
has been at all relevant times a tribunal where the respondents could seek just compensation
for the taking of their land by the United States. That tribunal is the Court of Claims." Id
at 647 n.8.
108. S. 216 was entitled "A bill to permit suits to be brought against the United States to
adjudicate disputed land titles." See Dipute of Titles on Public Lands. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on S. 216, S 579, S.
721, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S 216]. The pas-
sage of S. 216 was prefaced by a series of legislative enactments and proposals affecting
persons who adversely possessed government owned lands located along the Snake River in
Idaho.
109. 117 CONG. REC. 549 (1971) (statement of Sen. Church). It should be noted that
lower federal courts were taking the same view towards land title disputes with the sovereign
as that of Senator Church. See, e.g., County of Bonner, State of Idaho v. Anderson, 439
F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1971). ("As a matter of policy, it seems a shame that the County of
Bonner cannot find a forum or a proper party to sue to test its claim to the land in ques-
tion."); Gardner v. Harris, 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968). The Gardner case stated that
the persistence with which the Government successfully asserts immunity as to
property claims gives rise to several reactions. Not only does the result appear
unusual to many, but the fact that Congress does not ameliorate these hardships
appears even more unusual. The immunity is, however, very much alive.
Id at 887 n.3.
110. See supra note 108.
111. 117 CONG. REC. 549 (1971).
112. S. REP. No. 575, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT
575].
113. H.R. REP. No. 1559, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4547 [hereafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 1559].
114. The bill, S. 216, was introduced in the Senate on Jan. 26, 1971, as a bill to permit
suits against the United States in land title disputes. See 117 CONG. REC. 549 (1971). The
Senate conducted a hearing on September 30, 1971. See Senate Hearings on S, 216, supra
note 108. The Senate recommended the bill for passage on Dec. 10, 1971. The Committee's
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gress intended to relax the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it applies to
private claimants in land title disputes with the government." 5 Notwith-
standing the overall clarity of the Act with respect to private citizens, the
legislative history of the Act and subsection (f) in particular imparts little
information that answers directly whether Congress intended to grant im-
munity to states holding land in trust for the public." 6
As originally drafted, S. 216 succinctly provided that "[tlhe United
States [could] be named a party in any civil action brought by any person
to quiet title to lands claimed by the United States."' '" At hearings on S.
216, the Executive Branch expressed concern that the bill did not include
sufficient "safeguards for the protection of the public interest" and pro-
posed a more elaborate version of the bill.18 The Executive proposal, sub-
mitted by the Department of Justice (DOJ), included several limitations on
report stated that the provisions of the bill were largely those recommended by the United
States Department of Justice in an executive communication. See SENATE REPORT 575,
supra note 112, at 2. The Senate passed S. 216 with title amendment on Dec. 11, 1971, see
117 CONG. REC. 46,380 (1971), and the bill was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary on Dec. 13, 1971, id at 46,642. The House Committee reported S. 216 amended
with minor improvements in language on Oct. 10, 1972. See HOUSE REPORT 1559, supra
note 113, at 7. On the same day the bill was referred to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union. See 118 CONG. Rc. at 35,530 (1972). The Senate concurred
with the House on Oct. 13, 1972, id at 35,993, and S. 216 was approved as Pub. L. No. 92-
562 on Oct. 25, 1972, id at 37,324.
115. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT 1559, supra note 113, at 6, where the House noted that S.
216 provides a solution to the executive branch observation "that the main objection in the
past to waiving sovereign immunity in [the property dispute] area has been that should a
citizen . . . prove. . . title to. . .land, it might be possible to force the United States from
possession ...." Id (emphasis added). See also Senate Hearings on S, 216, supra note
108, at 19, (statement of Mitchell Melich, Solicitor, Dep't of the Interior) ("S.216 ... [is]
aimed at a. . .problem which is to allow private landowners to bring suit against the Fed-
eral Government to quiet title to their land." (emphasis added)).
116. See supra note 15. In Block, the United States Supreme Court based its interpreta-
tion of subsection (f) in part on statutory language that states that "any civil action" will be
time barred by the statute of limitations. 103 S. Ct. at 1820.
117. The original version of subsection (f) proposed by the Senate provided that:
[any civil action under this section shall be barred unless the action began within
six years after the claim for relief first accrues or within two years after the effective
date of this Act, whichever is later. The claim for relief shall be deemed to have
accrued upon actual knowledge of the claim of the United States.
117 CONG. REC. 46,380 (1971).
118. See Senate Hearing on S, 216, supra note 108, at 21 (statement of Shiro Kashiwa,
Ass't Atty. Gen.). In addition to S. 216, the Subcommittee heard testimony on S. 579 and S.
721. These bills were vigorously opposed by a number of cabinet level departments that
were asked to review the impending legislation. For example, in one Senate requested re-
port it was found that
S.579 would create a right of adverse possession against the United States by
prohibiting the United States from making an entry on or bringing any action to
recover public lands which have been held under a claim of title for a continuous
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the waiver of sovereign immunity. First, in an effort to avoid an unneces-
sarily burdensome workload, the DOJ suggested that the Act have only a
prospective effect." 9 Second, to avoid the possibility of the United States
having to defend against stale claims, the proposal included a twelve-year
statute of limitations. 2 ° Third, the bill proposed by the DOJ further ex-
cluded lands held in trust for Indians and Indian restricted lands.'
2 1
Fourth, in cases where the government did not prevail on the merits, the
proposal allowed the United States a choice of paying money damages or
returning property to the claimants if the latter would "disrupt costly
ongoing Federal programs." 122
The Senate passed S. 216 with all of the provisions suggested by the
period of not less than 20 years .... The doctrine of adverse possession has
never been applicable to lands owned by the Federal Government.
Id. at 4 (letter from Mitchell Melich, Solicitor, Dep't of the Interior, to Sen. Jackson (Sept.
29, 1971)). In another Senate requested report, bill S. 579 was again rejected because "[ijf
S.579 were enacted, the additional costs which should be incurred by the Federal landhold-
ing agencies to protect the interests of the public .. .would be substantial . . . .S.597
would lead to unjust enrichment of individuals at the expense of the people of the United
States generally." Id at 5 (letter from J. Phil Campbell, Under Secretary, Dep't of Agricul-
ture, to Sen. Jackson (Sept. 30, 1971)). Further rejection of the bill came from the Executive
Office of the President. Id at 3 (letter from Wilfred H. Rommel, Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference, Office of Management and Budget (Sept. 30, 1971)).
119. See HOUSE REPORT 1559, supra note 113, at 7 (letter from Ralph E. Erickson, Dep-
uty Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, to Rep. Harold D. Donohue, Chairman, Subcomm.
No. 2 Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Sept. 20, 1972)). The Department
of Justice asserted that the Act shall not be applied to claims that accrued prior to the date of
enactment so that the government would be relieved of the administrative burden of giving
notice of its claims to interests in lands to those individuals who also claim an interest in the
same land. Id
120. See HousE REPORT 1559, supra note 113, at 4, 7 (letter from Ralph E. Erickson,
Deputy Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, to Rep. Donohue (Sept. 20, 1972)). The Depart-
ment proposal specifically addressed the issues of retroactivity and the statute of limitations.
The Senate version, which began the limitations period on the date the United States ob-
tained actual knowledge of the property, made the bill fully retroactive. The Department
proposal made the bill retroactive for twelve years. Additionally, the Department suggested
that "the statute of limitation be extended from six to twelve years for quiet title actions."
The purpose was to "give claimants to land in which the United States also claims an inter-
est ample time to bring suits without necessitating the United States having to defend
against stale claims." Id.
121. See HOUSE REPORT 1559, supra note 113, at 10 (executive communication from the
Dep't of Justice to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Oct. 6, 197 1)). The purpose
of a waiving of immunity in the area of Indian lands was to maintain all previous commit-
ments made through Indian treaties and agreements. This position was supported by the
United States Department of the Interior when it noted that President Nixon had pledged
his administration against abridging the "historic relationship between the Federal govern-
ment and the Indians." SENATE HEARINGS ON S. 216, supra note 108, at 19 (statement of
Mitchell Melich, Solicitor, Department of the Interior).
122. See SENATE HEARINGS ON S. 216, supra note 108, at 19.
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DOJ except the provision governing the bill's prospective effect.' 2 3 The
Senate-approved bill contained a grandfather clause allowing the assertion
of old claims for a period of two years after the bill became law. The DOJ
subsequently voiced its opposition to the Senate version of the bill. It ob-
jected to the grandfather clause, arguing that it would result in a "flood of
litigation on old claims."' 2 4 In an effort to persuade Congress to eliminate
this clause, the DOJ abandoned its support for prospective relief. Instead,
it suggested a "reasonable [twelve-year] period of retroactive application
of the bill."' 25
The final version of S. 216 passed by the House included the compro-
mise provision recommended by the DOJ. 2 6 The Senate concurred with
those recommendations and S. 216 became law.' 27 The examination of
events and issues leading to the passage of the QTA reveals that Congress
primarily intended to provide private claimants with a means of relief in
quiet title actions against the sovereign. Additionally, that means of relief
was specifically limited by the twelve-year limitation period. Despite this,
neither the Act itself nor the record leading to its passage contains any
indication of whether Congress intended to apply the limitation on actions
to the states. The answer to that question, therefore, can only be gleaned
from case law dealing with the issue of immunity and the sovereign.
C The Federal Court Application of Limitations Against the Sovereign:
An Awareness of Public Policy
The rule that the statute of limitations does not run against a sovereign
government was established in a very early land dispute case, Lindsey v.
Lessee of Miller.'28 In Lindsey, the Supreme Court was asked to settle a
title dispute where the validity of a title issued by the Commonwealth of
Virginia was offered as paramount over one issued by the United States.129
The plaintiffs, on behalf of the United States government, brought an ac-
tion of ejectment to recover property occupied by Lindsey and others. The
plaintiffs proffered that true title had been derived from a patent issued by
the United States in 1824.130 The defendants claimed title to the land pur-
suant to a patent issued thirty-five years earlier by the Commonwealth and
123. See 117 CONG. REC. 46,380 (1971).
124. See HOUSE REPORT 1559, supra note 113, at 7 (letter of Ralph E. Erickson, Deputy
Atty. Gen.).
125. Id
126. See HOUSE REPORT 1559, supra note 113.
127. See 118 CONG. REC. 37,329 (1972).
128. 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 666 (1832).
129. Id. at 672-73.
130. Id at 672.
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also offered proof that the land had been occupied continually for upwards
of thirty years.'3a  At trial, the plaintiffs prevailed under the theory that
neither the defendants' title, which was found to be void, nor the defend-
ant's uninterrupted possession barred the plaintiffs' right to recover.
13 2
The Circuit Court for the District of Ohio upheld the trial decision.,
3 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the defendants' claim that the
continuous possession barred any recovery based on a United States pat-
ent. 134 Recognizing the underlying claim as one against a sovereign,135 the
Lindsey Court stated that "[i]t is a well settled principle that the statute of
limitations does not run against a state."' 136 In reaching its decision, the
Court reasoned that by imposing a statute of limitations upon the govern-
ment, "the public domain would soon be appropriated by adventurers." 37
It therefore concluded that the "wisdom and propriety" of the immunity
doctrine made it necessary to affirm the lower court's decision. 3 '
Over a century after its decision in Lindsey the Supreme Court, in Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. United States,139 once again held that statutes of limita-
tion are not applicable to a sovereign.'" ° In Guaranty, the United States
brought suit on behalf of the Russian government against the Guaranty
Trust Company to recover bank deposits made by the foreign govern-
ment.14 ' Following a trial court dismissal based on the running of a six-
year statute of limitations, the case was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 142 The court of appeals ad-
dressed whether a foreign government could be barred by a statute of limi-
tations.'4 3 While conceding there was no direct authority on that point,
the court held that it was "settled law" that the statute of limitations did
131. Id at 668.
132. Id
133. Miller v. Lindsey, 17 F. Cas. 331 (C.C.D. Ohio 1829) (No. 9580).
134. Lindsey, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 672.
135. Id. at 673. The Court articulated that "the possession of the defendants does not
bar the plaintiff's action, is a point too clear to admit of much controversy." Id
136. Id.
137. Id The Court used the following scenario to reinforce the propriety of the rule that
the statute never operates against the government. It stated that "[i]f a contrary rule were
sanctioned, it would only be necessary for intruders upon public lands to maintain their
possessions, until the statute of limitations shall run; and then they would become invested
with the title against the government, and all persons claiming under it." Id.
138. Id
139. 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
140. Id. at 132.
141. Id at 129.
142. 91 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1937).
143. Id. at 899.
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not bar a sovereign. "
The Supreme Court reversed that part of the appeals court ruling which
held that a foreign government's claim is not barred by the statute of limi-
tations. 45 However, it was steadfast in upholding the lower court decision
regarding sovereign immunity and domestic governments. The Guaranty
Court reasoned that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was founded upon
the "great public policy" of preserving the right of the public and its prop-
erty from loss attributable to the negligence of public officers.' 46 The
Court further noted that the right of immunity was created for the "public
benefit" and was "equally applicable to all government."'' 47
The theme developed in Lindsey and Guaranty has been maintained in
several recent cases decided by the Court. In Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe,148 a case that involved title litigation with Indians, 49 the Court held
that in order for a statute to affect a sovereign the statutory language must
expressly include the sovereign.' 50 The Wilson Court emphasized that this
is particularly applicable "where the statute imposes a burden or limita-
tion, as distinguished from conferring a benefit or advantage.""'s' With
respect to the issue of protecting public lands, Wilson demonstrates that
the Court will not implant its own interpretation upon statutes that do not
specifically mandate the application of a statute of limitations upon a sov-
ereign.' 52 A similar conclusion was reached less than two years later in
Montana v. United States.' 53
In Montana, the United States, on behalf of an Indian tribe, sought to
quiet title to the river bed and the banks of the Big Horn River in Mon-
tana. The Court addressed the issue of whether the ownership of land
144. Id. (citing Davis v. Corona Coal Co., 265 U.S. 219 (1924)).
145. 304 U.S. at 141.
146. Id at 132.
147. Id
148. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
149. Id at 657. In Wilson, an Indian Tribe and the United States sued to quiet title to
land that had been affected by movement of a river that served as an interstate boundary.
Id.
150. Id at 667.
151. Id.; see United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 301, 315 (1840) ("a statute which
proposes only to regulate the mode of proceeding in suits, does not divest the public of any
right .... ").
152. Wilson, 442 U.S. at 666-67. The Wilson Court refused to accept a broad definition
of terms as an aid to statutory construction. The Court held that if "[i]n common usage, [a
term] does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the [term] are ordinarily construed
to exclude [the sovereign]." Id at 667 (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600,
604 (1941)).
153. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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under navigable waters is an incident of sovereignty. " In framing its de-
cision, the Court reiterated a policy of trust land preservation established
in case law over one hundred years earlier. 55 It found that the prevailing
ownership of land under navigable waters "is an incident of sovereignty"
founded upon the equal footing doctrine.' 56 The Court emphasized that
unless congressional intentions were "definitely declared or otherwise
made plain," it would not act to convey the sovereign's land. 5 7
For over one hundred and twenty-five years the courts and Congress
have given great deference to the sovereign holding land in trust for the
public. Without explicit congressional direction to the contrary, subse-
quent decisions arguably should have followed the precedent set forth in
the cases reviewed.' The Supreme Court, however, reached a contrary
decision in Block v. North Dakota ex rel Board of University and School
Lands.159
III. BLOCK v NORTH DAKOTA EX REL. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY AND
SCHOOL LANDs
A. Statutory Construction.: Literal Interpretation or Rational Process?
In Block v. North Dakota, ex rel Board of University and School
Lands, 6 ' the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the propriety of
an action under the QTA as the sole remedy available to North Dakota to
assert title to lands within her borders. 6 ' Additionally, it recognized that
the sovereign is normally exempt from operation of generally worded stat-
utes of limitation. 6 ' Despite this, the Court failed to adhere to this judi-
cially created rule.'6 3 Justice White, writing for the majority, determined
154. Id at 551. See generally supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
155. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (judicial recognition of
the need for control of trust land to be in the hands of the sovereign); see also Montana, 450
U.S. at 551-52; cf. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How) at 230. In Pollard, the Court found that a state
that is holding trust land shall be on an "equal footing" with the government. Id at 222-24;
see supra note 22. The Pollard Court reasoned that the taking of such land would be "re-
pugnant" to the Constitution and contrary to Congressional intent. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 224.
156. Montana, 450 U.S. at 551; see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
157. Montana, 450 U.S. at 552.
158. See supra note 51.
159. 103 S. Ct. 1811 (1983).
160. Id
161. Id at 1819.
162. Id at 1821.
163. Id The Block majority relied on Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 304 U.S. 126 at
132 (1938), to support the proposition that, "[t]he judicially-created rule that a sovereign is
normally exempt from the operation of a generally-worded statute of limitations has re-
tained its vigor because it serves the public policy of preserving the public rights, revenues,
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that the statute of limitations period, provided by subsection (f) of the
QTA, was applicable to both private and state claimants. 6 4 Thus, the
Court held that the state's claim was barred if it was filed more than twelve
years after the action became legally enforceable. 65
In addressing North Dakota's initial claim to title under an officer's suit
theory, Justice White stated that in enacting the QTA, Congress intended
to provide a new and exclusive means for challenging title to United States
property. 166 Thus, the Court held that an officer's suit could not be used as
an alternative means to challenge government title.' 67 It reasoned that if
such suits were still permitted, both the Indian lands exception and the
Federal land payments provision would be "rendered nugatory.' 68 Be-
cause an officer's suit would allow the claimant to proceed against federal
officials in charge of the land rather than against the government itself, 69
the Court asserted that the suit would also allow the claimant to avoid the
QTA's twelve-year statute of limitation.'70 It further reasoned that the cir-
cumvention of the QTA would be contrary to Congress' intention to pro-
tect the "national public interest" through the provisions of the Act.' 7 '
and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers." Block, 103 S. Ct. at
1821.
164. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1821-22.
165. Id. at 1823.
166. Id at 1819.
167. Id at 1818. "As the jurisdictional basis for its suit, North Dakota invoked 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202
(declaratory judgment and further relief); and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (the judicial review pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et. seq.)." Id at 1815.
168. Id at 1818.
169. Id. at 1817. The Block majority noted that "[t]he predominant view [was] that citi-
zens asserting title to or the right to possession of lands claimed by the United States were
'without benefit of a recourse to the courts,' because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity."
Id Prior to the passage of the Tucker Act in 1887 and the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946,
the "officer's suit" allowed the claimant to "indulge in the fiction that the doctrine [of sover-
eign immunity]" was not applicable in a limited number of cases where suit was brought
against agents of the government rather than the United States. Senate Hearing on S. 216,
supra note 108 at 64 (statement of John M. Steadman, Prof. of Law, University of Penn-
sylvania). See generally Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962) (narrowing the use of
officer suits to cases involving specific activities by government agents); Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Meigs v.
M'Clung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11, (1815) (accepting the "officer's suit" as a means of
avoiding the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Steadman, supra note 46.
170. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1818-19.
171. Id. at 1818. The national public interest position was deemed by Justice White to
be the underlying purpose of the "carefully-crafted provisions of the QTA." Id In response
to North Dakota's position that an officer's suit was an alternative means of relief, Justice
White quoted Brown v. GS,4: "It would require the suspension of disbelief to ascribe to
Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented
by artful pleading." Id at 1818 (quoting Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976)).
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The Block Court then examined North Dakota's position that as a state
it was not subject to the QTA's subsection (f) statute of limitation. The
Court maintained that under the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity,
the United States could not be sued without the express consent of Con-
gress.' 72 Moreover, it asserted that when conditions such as limitations
provisions are attached to legislation waiving government immunity, those
provisions must be "strictly observed." 173 Consequently, the Court rea-
soned that for it to find that Congress intended to exempt North Dakota
from the subsection (f) provision of the QTA, there must be "some clear
indication of such an intention."' 74  In applying this rationale to the
QTA's limitation provisions, the Court examined both the language of the
statute and its legislative history. 175 It determined first that the language
of subsection (f) did not expressly provide an exemption for state civil ac-
tions. Secondly, it determined that despite North Dakota's position that
congressional silence is evidence of an intent to exempt the state,' 76 the
legislative history did not yield any indication that Congress intended to
exempt the states from the strictures of subsection (0.177
Justice White also found it apparent from the legislative history of the
Act that subsection (f) was designed to protect "congressionally recognized
national public interests."17 8 He reasoned that a suit by a state affects the
national public interest to the same extent as does a suit by a private
party.179 Justice White concluded that although Congress created a gener-
ally worded statute not expressly limiting state actions against the United
States,'80 the interests of citizens of a particular state must yield when it is
172. Id at 1819-20 (citing cases).
173. Id at 1820.
174. Id The majority found that a "necessary corollary" to the rule that the United
States cannot be sued without consent is that when Congress waives sovereign immunity,
exceptions to the waiver are not to be lightly implied. Id Justice O'Connor vigorously
opposed this concept on the basis that "mere observation that a statute waives sovereign
immunity. . cannot resolve questions of construction." Id at 1823.
175. Id. at 1820.
176. Id Justice White noted that like the dissent, the court below relied on congressional
silence. He acknowledged language in the House Report pertaining to "persons," "citizens,"
and "individual citizens" but stated that "such general language [had little] relevance at all."
Id at 1820 n.24.
177. Id. at 1820.
178. Id at 1821. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
179. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1821.
180. Id The Block majority recognized the importance of the rule exempting a sover-
eign from the operation of generally worded statutes. Justice White maintained that this
rule was necessary to promote the policy of protecting public property and revenue from the
"negligence of state officials [who fail] to comply with [an] otherwise applicable statute of
limitations." Id at 1821. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 304 U.S. at 132 (stating
that where the state or national government is not expressly mentioned in a statute, they are
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determined that Congress intended to protect broader national interests. 1 8'
The Court thus held that because a state's claim included the type of "mis-
chief" Congress intended to remedy, 82 the state must also adhere to the
requirements of subsection (f) when suing the federal government.
Finally, the Block majority addressed North Dakota's contention that
even if Congress intended to apply subsection (f) to the states, its applica-
tion would be unconstitutional under both the equal footing doctrine and
the tenth amendment, because subsection () attempts to bar claims to
lands that are constitutionally vested in the state.'83 The Court disagreed
with North Dakota's arguments for finding subsection (f) unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, it conceded that under the fifth amendment a taking of con-
stitutionally vested state land would be unconstitutional without just com-
pensation. 184 The Court held, however, that subsection (f) was not enacted
to deprive a state or any other claimant of property rights. 185 It reasoned
that the subsection was designed to limit only the time period in which a
title suit could be filed. Furthermore, the majority noted that subsection
(f) did not affect the claimant's title in the same manner as an action for
adverse possession where establishing possession could deprive a party of
title rights.' 86 The Court reasoned that even if the statutory period had
lapsed, a state would still retain title. Therefore, the Block Court main-
tained that North Dakota could continue to assert its right to title "in hope
of inducing the United States to file its own quiet title suit."'
' 87
It is generally held that the judiciary should declare the express intent of
the legislature even if such intentions appear injudicious to the court.188
exempt from statutes of limitation). The Block Court, however, did not apply the rule of
express congressional intent to North Dakota's claim.
181. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1821.
182. Id at 1821-22 (quoting Weber v. Board of State Harbor Commissioners, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 57, 70 (1873)).
183. Id at 1822.
184. Id
185. Id
186. Id
187. Id
188. See, e.g., River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 743, 764-65 (H.L. 1877).
Viewing the Judge's role in statutory construction, the River Wear court stated,
[b]ut it is to be borne in mind that the office of the Judges is not to legislate, but to
declare the expressed intention of the Legislature, even if that intention appears to
the Court injudicious; and I believe that it is not disputed that. . . we are to take
the whole statute together, and construe it all together, giving the words their ordi-
nary signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an
absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention
could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification and to justify the
Court in putting on them some other signification, which, though less proper, is
one which the Court thinks the words will bear.
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As the sole dissenter in Block, Justice O'Connor approached the question
of congressional intent by rejecting the majority's language-based interpre-
tation. Justice O'Connor observed that the majority had relied solely on
principles of statutory construction in determining congressional intent.18 9
Although she acknowledged the value of this approach, Justice O'Connor
asserted that statutory construction alone could not "grant the Court the
authority to narrow judicially" that which was intended by Congress.' 90
Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court's position that Congress had
enacted the QTA as a sole remedy in title actions against the United
States. 191 Unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor supported the rule that
statutes of limitation do not bar a sovereign. She approached the issue of
whether Congress intended the statute of limitations to bar state action by
rejecting the majority's position that waivers of sovereign immunity are to
be strictly construed.' 92 Moreover, Justice O'Connor maintained that the
mere observation that a statute waives sovereign immunity can only aid in
determining congressional intent in "close case[s]."' 93 She asserted that
the Court cannot judicially narrow waivers of sovereign immunity without
first considering "all [the] indicia of congressional intent."' g Justice
O'Connor noted that Congress had expressed its desire to exclude states
from the statute of limitations found in subsection (f) by its declaration of
intent to protect title to lands held in trust for the public. She emphasized
that the common law principle that "neither laches nor statutes of limita-
tion will bar the sovereign""' and the overriding public policy of "pre-
serving public rights and property from injury and loss" resulting from the
Id For a general review of the court's role in statutory construction, see .4 Symposium on
Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REV. 365 (1950); Note, Judge Learned Hand and the
Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370 (1947); Note, A Note on Statutory Interpre-
tation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
189. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1823.
190. Id (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955)).
191. Id at 1823.
192. Id Justice O'Connor noted that the majority did not decide whether the action
would be barred by sovereign immunity if there were no QTA. She maintained that if in
fact the QTA was not a waiver, then North Dakota's claim would not "present the predi-
cate" that would allow the "application of the principle that waivers are construed nar-
rowly." Therefore, Justice O'Connor found the principle of strict construction informative
but not controlling. Id at 1823 n. 1.
193. Id. at 1823.
194. Id
195. Id (citing 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 354 (1938); D. GIB-
BONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIMITATIONS AND PRESCRIPTION 62 (1835)); see Weber
v. Board of State Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); United States v. Kirkpat-
rick, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 735 (1824); Iverson & Robinson v. Dubose, 27 Ala. 418, 422(1855); Stughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 522, 528 (1808).
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negligence of public officials precluded a finding that the states are barred
by subsection (0.196 She further reasoned that in cases of lands held in
trust for the public, "these policies reach their apex" because the public
interest is placed in jeopardy by any "constraints on the sovereign."' 97 She
concluded that a Court should show extreme reluctance to reject the usual
rule that a sovereign is not barred by time.' 98
Justice O'Connor noted that the Court had dismissed the rule because
the action was between two sovereigns. 99 She asserted that an early case
cited by the Court had failed to specifically address the issue at hand and
had involved a claim for damages rather than an action to quiet title.2"
Justice O'Connor also rejected the application of a later Supreme Court
holding cited by the majority in which the United States had failed to
waive its immunity in a suit by a state in state court.20' She maintained
that because there was no general rule allowing states to bring suits in any
chosen forum, the holding construing the waiver of sovereign immunity
narrowly against the state was justified. She indicated that this was noth-
ing more than the Court's usual reluctance to broadly construe waivers of
sovereign immunity in the absence of any indication of congressional in-
tent to do otherwise.20 2 Therefore, she concluded that the precedents cited
failed to alter the principle that in conflicts between sovereigns, time is not
a bar.20 3
196. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1824.
197. See, e.g., supra notes 128-137 and accompanying text. The dissent distinguished
trust lands from those held by a state for other purposes. It reasoned that time may run
against the sovereign, for example, when the state holds land in a "proprietary capacity."
Block at 1824 n.2 (citing Weber v. Board of State Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 57, 68
(1973)).
198. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1824.
199. Id. at 1825. The majority maintained that it had never recognized the sovereignty
of other governments as a bar to claims of the federal government. Id at 1821 n.25. Yet, in
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 233 (1841), as noted by Justice O'Connor,
the Rhode Island Court stated, "it would be impossible with any semblance of justice to
adopt such a rule of limitation in the case before us. For here two political communities are
concerned, who cannot act with the same promptness as individuals .... ." Id Rhode Is-
land, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 273 (quoted in Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1825); see New Orleans v.
United States, U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836) (where, because public trust lands were involved, the
Court decided to estop the city from asserting title to public trust lands).
200. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1824. The majority relied upon United States v. Louisiana, 127
U.S. 182 (1888), to support the position that "a general statute of limitations, one that did
not expressly mention States, barred a State's claim against the Federal Government." Id
at 1820-21.
201. Id. at 1824. In the cited case, Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939), the
Federal Government had waived its immunity to suit only in federal courts and, thus, the
Court dismissed the state's suit for lack of jurisdiction.
202. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1824.
203. Id. at 1824-25.
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The dissent also considered the legislative history of the QTA. It em-
phasized that Congress had acknowledged an awareness of the rule that
statutes must expressly include a sovereign to affect a sovereign. 2" Justice
O'Connor noted that notwithstanding this principle of "general back-
ground," the particular incident that had prompted Congress to enact the
QTA involved a "dispute between private landowners and the Federal
Government."2 5 She observed that on several occasions the legislators
referred to the claims of "private citizens"2 °6 and "private landowners. 20 7
Additionally, she emphasized that in the House Report the legislators had
referred to the purpose of subsection (f) as a means of giving " 'persons' a
certain amount of time to sue."2 8 Justice O'Connor further asserted that
the language of the statutory history that refers to private citizens could be
distinguished from that of the statute itself which refers to "any" quiet title
20actions. 09 She emphasized that the Court had already applied the provi-
sions of the QTA to the "special requirements of litigation involving
States" 210 in an earlier case, California v. Arizona .211 The dissent noted
that despite the QTA's language that "all" quiet title actions are tried in
district court, the- California Court had refused to relinquish its original
jurisdiction over the state defendant even though the QTA required that
the United States, a codefendant, be sued in district court. Thus, despite
the general language of "all quiet title actions," Justice O'Connor asserted
that the Court did not apply the statute with exacting literalism. 212 Based
on Calfornia and the QTA's legislative history, Justice O'Connor main-
tained that while Congress intended that states be allowed to bring quiet
title actions, it did not intend to have procedural provisions designed for
private citizens "applied with slavish literalness to States., 213
Finally, the dissent inferred that the Court's position was insensitive to
the importance and special nature of the lands. 21 4 It asserted that prior to
Block, the Court had recognized the "strongest presumption" that Con-
204. Id. (citing Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979)).
205. Id. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
206. See Senate Hearings on S, 216, supra note 108, at 20 (statement of Shiro Kashiwa,
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Land and Natural Resources Division of the
Department of Justice).
207. Id at 55, 58 (statements of Senator Church and T. E. McKnight).
208. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing HousE REPORT 1559,
supra note 113, at 5).
209. See supra note 116.
210. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1825.
211. 440 U.S. 59 (1979).
212. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1825-26.
213. Id at 1826.
214. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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gress preferred to preserve land for states rather than conveying them.215
Moreover, Justice O'Connor suggested that under the equal footing doc-
trine,2" 6 beds of navigable waters passed to the states which in turn hold
them in trust for their citizens.2 7 Therefore, she concluded that it was
difficult to conceive that Congress intended to relieve the state of its re-
sponsibility over the lands by denying its right to quiet title.2' 8
B. The Possible Deprivation of Public Rights to Trust Land Held by a
Sovereign
The Block majority and the dissent agreed that the sole remedy avail-
able to North Dakota was an action under the QTA. In deciding to bar a
state claim if it is asserted beyond the subsection (f) limitation period of
the Act, the majority chose not to apply the canon of statutory construction
that statutes of limitation do not bar a sovereign absent express legislative
inclusion.219 It chose instead to focus on the basic rule of federal sovereign
immunity and its corollary that waivers are to be strictly construed.220 The
majority's focus on the rule and its corollary, however, belies the complex-
ity of the question.22'
As the dissent asserted, a strict construction of waivers of sovereign im-
munity is only a means to ascertain Congress' intent.222 Although the ma-
jority claimed to have scrutinized the legislative history to glean the intent
of a statute not expressly exempting the states, it failed to consider all the
evidence before it. In construing the Act, the Block majority utilized a two
step process. First, following a basic tenet of statutory construction, the
Court examined the statutory language in an attempt to ascertain any ex-
ception for civil action by states.223 Second, failing to find one, the Court
properly turned to the legislative history of the Act. It did not, however,
fully explore all possible indicia of congressional intent. For example, the
215. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1826 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981)). In Montana,, the Court held that, "because control over the
property underlying navigable waters is so strongly identified with the sovereign power of
government ... it will not be held that the United States has conveyed such land except
because of 'some international duty or public exigency.'" Montana, 450 U.S. at 552 (citing
United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1934); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
49, 55 (1925)).
216. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
217. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1826.
218. Id
219. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 192-94 and accompanying text.
222. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1823.
223. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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Court overlooked the fact that legislation leading to the passage of the
QTA was introduced as a means of resolving disputes between private citi-
zens and the federal government.224 Additionally, it overlooked repeated
references in the legislative history to the rights of private citizens and
landowners. 225 At the hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands,
the statements of both the legislators and invited speakers focused on the
private citizen's inability to sue the government.226 Finally, as the dissent
noted, the final House Report interprets the subsection (f) limitation as
designed to give "persons" a limited time period in which to sue. 2 27
In its interpretation of the legislative history, however, the Block Court
did not deem this documentation sufficient to illustrate that Congress en-
acted the QTA with private citizens in mind.22' Although the Court's
method of statutory construction would be valid in some instances, 229 here
it falls short of being compatible with congressional intent. The Court's
emphasis upon the general statutory language of "any quiet title action" is
misplaced given the improbability that the Act would run counter to posi-
tions advanced in the legislative history. Thus, in searching for express
224. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S, 216, supra note 108, at 20-2 1. The concept of pro-
viding for the private claimant is best illustrated in the Senate hearings on S. 216 which
include statements by Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Public
Lands and Shiro Kashiwa, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Divi-
sion, Department of Justice:
Mr. Kashiwa. There is obviously a problem for the private claimant ...
In our view, the provisions of the bill are too broad and sweeping in scope...
to protect the public interest ...
Senator Church. [The Justice Department's proposal] may give us a key to do
something that has long needed doing, giving people the right to go into court to
clear title when there is a disputed title and the Government is involved.
Id.
227. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1825.
228. Id. at 1820. The Block majority stated:
Recognizing that no express legislative history supports its position, North Dakota
relies on congressional silence. As did the Court of Appeals . . . North Dakota
notes the references in the House Committee report. . . to "persons, "citizens,"
and "individual citizens," and the absence of any references to "states." However,
to the extent that such general language has any relevance at all, the report also
refers to "plaintiffis]," "owners of adjacent property," "land owner[s]," and "claim-
ants" - all terms that can easily encompass States.
Id at 1820 n.24.
229. Id at 1823. O'Connor felt that "[i]n a close case, [construing waivers of sovereign
immunity strictly] may help the Court choose between two equally plausible constructions."
Id.
[Vol. 33:773
Quiet Title Act
congressional intent to exclude the states, the Block Court arguably has
ignored the substantive evidence of both language and purpose that fo-
cuses on the protection of private interests.
The Court also failed to apply the longstanding canon of statutory con-
struction that "statutes of limitation are not. . . held to embrace the State,
unless she is expressly designated."23 Instead, it pointed to the contrary
holding of United States v. Louisiana13 1 to support its contention that in
fashioning the statute, Congress was free to expressly exempt the state.232
Although the Louisiana Court specifically stated that a general statute of
limitation that did not mention the state barred the state's claim against
the federal government, the Court's application of this holding to North
Dakota's claim is questionable. As the dissent recognized, the facts of Lou-
isiana did not involve a dispute over title to trust lands, but rather one
involving a claim for money. Additionally, the litigants in Louisiana never
argued that the rule that time does not bar the sovereign should be applied.
The Block Court's disregard of these significant distinguishing factors
weakens its reliance upon Louisiana.
In another weak attempt to justify its position, the Court distinguished
the interests of state citizens from those of the congressionally-recognized
"national public interest." '233 It maintained that state actions affect the na-
tional public interest to the same extent as private actions. It is an estab-
lished principle, however, that a sovereign is normally exempt from
generally worded statutes of limitation because this policy preserves public
rights from loss by negligent public officials.2 34 As the dissent noted, this
policy reaches its "apex" in cases involving public trust lands.235 Because
the "national public" is comprised of state residents, the majority's attempt
to distinguish the two arguably is illogical.
Finally, the majority maintained that if a claimant has title he retains it
even if his suit is barred. This assertion provides little consolation to the
state claimants who seek possession. Furthermore, under this standard the
public is likely to lose its rights due to the Court's application of con-
straints on the sovereign. The rights referred to are the use and enjoyment
of the land. The right to assert title becomes illusory when it depends on
230. See Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 70 (1873).
231. 127 U.S. 182 (1888).
232. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1820-21.
233. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. Accord, Weber v. Board of Harbor
Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 57, 68, 70; United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 315.
235. Block, 103 S. Ct. at 1824.
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the success of inducing the United States to file its own quiet title suit. 36
IV. CONCLUSION
In Block v. North Dakota ex rel Board of University and School Lands,
the Supreme Court held that when a state brings suit to challenge title to
public lands in which the federal government also claims an interest, the
state, like other claimants, must adhere to all statutory limitation periods.
The Block Court grounded its decision on a literal interpretation of the
limitation provision of the QTA. In so doing the Court arguably ignored
precedent in its determination of congressional intent. Moreover, it failed
to recognize documented evidence that facilitated the task of determining
such intent. The dissent, on the other hand, employed an interpretation
technique that considered not only past judicial decisions and record evi-
dence, but also applied a sense of fairness towards public policy that accu-
rately reflects the legislative meaning of the QTA.
It is likely that the Court's ruling will, in many instances, deprive the
American public of its rights to valuable public trust lands in those in-
stances where a sovereign's right to assert title to those lands is barred by
the Act's limitation period. In sum, Block will require states to submit to a
statute that was drafted to affect only private claimants. It is now up to
Congress to rectify the inequities created by Block. Additionally, it is in-
cumbent upon the legislature to provide, through amendment, clear and
explicit language that better reflects its intention to preserve public trust
lands.
Carlton Wayne Washington
236. See id at 1822.
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